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On September 29, 2009, Treasury issued regulations 
retroactively1 extending the six-year limitations period 
for income tax deficiencies resulting from basis overstate-
ments.2 In its May 6 Intermountain decision, the Tax Court 
tmanimously invalidated those regulations, but on di-
vided rationales.3 The government has appealed. 
lntermountain is a must-read for tax academics and 
practitioners. It is among the richest decisions on the 
procedural and substantive valid ity of tax regulations.4 
Moreover, the opinions in the case, subsequent cases on 
the issue, .and commentary on these opinions and cases 
present genuine opportunity for improvement of the law. 
This report has five sections. Section I sketches the 
growing significance of administrative law in tax law. 
The days of comfortable insularity are drawing to a close. 
To maintain; dexterity in the years to come, tax practi~ 
tioners and tax scholars will increasingly need to possess 
competence in broader principles of administrative law. 
Intemwuntain is a harbinger of that growing necessity. 
Section II describes the background of the case, summa-
rizes the three opinions rendered in it, and evaluates the 
result reached. I think that the Intermountain result is 
correct but (in terms of the arguments in the opinions) 
1Although the regulations apply to returns for years before 
2009, the IRS denies that they are retroactive, reasorung that a 
regulation has retroactive effect only if it would impair a party's 
rights, increase his liability for past conduct, or impose new 
duties ~s to conduct already completed, none of which the regs 
do, according to the IRS. Respondent's brief in support of 
motion to vacate order and, decision, Intermo1mtain Ins. Serv. of 
Vail LLC, Tl1omas A. Davies, Tax Matters Partner v. Commissioner, 
134 T.C. No. 11, at 7-10 Gan. 5, 2010), Doc 2010-10163, 2010 TNT 
88-12, (hereafter "IRS brief"). The IRS further contends that the 
regulations, even if they are retroactive, are valid under the 
effective date of section 7805(b) and the "prevention of abuse" 
exception of section 7805(b )(3). Id. at 10-13 . 
2Temp. reg. sections 301.6229(c)(2)-IT and 301.6501(e)-IT. 
3lntennountain, supra note 1, appeal docketed, No. 10-1204 (D.C. 
Cir. July 30, 2010). . . 4Illustrating the pace at which this area is developing, 
another important administrative law tax case, Swallows Hold-
ing, preceded Intennountnin by only a few years. Swallows 
Holding Ltd. v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 6 (2006), Doc 2006-1541, 
2006 TNT18-10, rev'd, 515 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2008), Doc 2008-3372, 
2008 TNT 33-41. For discussion of Swallows Holding, see Steve R. 
Johnson, "Swallows as It Might Have Been: Regulations Revising 
Case Law," Tax Notes, Aug. 28, 2006, p. 773, Doc 2006-14217, or 
2006 TNT 167-105; Johnson, "Swallows Holding as It Is: The 
Distortion of National M11fjler," Tax Notes, July 24, 2006, p. 351, 
Doc 2006-13093, or 2006 TNT 142-37. 
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only on the procedural gronnd advanced by two concur-
ring judges: that the regulations violate the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA) for failure to satisfy the notice-
and-comment requirements. 
Sections ID, IV, and V address some important aspects 
of Intermountain. My treatment is selective. Leaving some 
material for future discussion, I delve into three of the 
interesting veins of the case, including issues appearing 
in the opinions as well as issues omitted from them. 
Section Ill discusses whether the regulations at issue 
in the case are legislative or interpretive in nature. This 
matters to the APA argument. Unless another exception 
applies (and none does in Intermountain), legislative 
regulations must go through notice-and-comment, but 
interpretive regulations need not. I conclude that the 
challenged regulations are legislative, and I urge tax 
practitioners to refine their definitions of legislative and 
interpretive regulations. 
Section IV examines the light shed by Intermountain on 
the Brand X rule as to when agency rulemaking may 
displace prior judicial interpretations of statutes.5 I con-
clude that Intermountain and similar cases may help at 
one level: whether "magic words" must appear in the 
judicial interpretations. However, they are unlikely to 
help at two other levels: what should be done if the 
precedents' characterizations are rmsupportable, and 
whether the Brand X analysis of the rmderlying statute 
turns on the statute's language or also embraces perti-
nent legislative history. 
Section V explores two arguments that weren't con-
sidered in the Intermountain opinions but that might be 
brought against the temporary regulations in future 
cases. One such argwnent is that the temporary regula-
tions have not gone through the notice-and-comment 
process, and Chevron deference is rarely accorded to 
administrative rules and interpretations that were not 
subject to this process. This argwnent is of short-term 
significance. It will evaporate after the regulations in 
their proposed form complete the process. 
The other argument has to do with whether Congress 
explicitly or implicitly authorized Treasury to promul-
gate regulations extending section 6501(e) to overstated 
basis situations. The explicit authorization argument 
involves a contention I will develop at greater length in a 
future article. Briefly, the statutory authority under which 
the temporary regulations were promulgated allows 
Treasury to "prescribe all needful rules and regulations 
for the enforcement of" the code.6 It is arguable -
although far from certain - that this language authorizes 
only rules that implement code provisions, not rules that 
extend code provisions to situations beyond the provi-
sions' original scope. If Congress did not explicitly au-
thorize the rules at issue, it probably did not implicitly 
authorize them, either. Section 6501 is a highly detailed 
and articulated statute; courts usually are disinclined to 
allow other, extrinsic rules to be read into such statutes to 
modify them. 
5Nat'/ Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 
U.S. 967 (2005). 
6Section 7805(a). 
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I. Admin Laws Growing Importance in Tax Law 
As is true of other specialties in law, there is 
tendency toward insularity in tax practice.? Because 0~ 
the ever-growing complexity of the law, this tendency is 
understandable, but ultimately nntenable. The days are 
long gone when an attorney could practice the whole law 
Indeed, specialization has yielded to sub-sub~ 
specialization. Few are the lawyers or professors who can 
legitimately claim to be competent in all areas of tax Jaw 
Because we are barely able to keep up with our own are~ 
of law, it is not surprising that we greet with little 
enthusiasm the notion that we also need to learn other 
areas of law (like general administrative law). 
But yield we must. The tax conununity will not be able 
to avoid being dragged into functional competence in 
general administrative law. Both the APA8 and admin.is-
trative common law9 have long made appearances in tax 
cases, although they have not always been handled 
wen.io 
Events in recent decades have brought into greater 
prominence the intersection of tax law and administra-
tive law. One such event was the Chevron decision. 
7For articles noting this tendency, see Bryan T. Camp, "Tax 
Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial Para-
digm Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998," 56 
Fla. L. Rev. 1, 2-3 (2004); Paul L. Caron, "Tax Myopia, or Mamas 
Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be Tax Lawyers," 13 Va. Tax 
Rev. 517, 518 (1994); Kristin E. Hickman," A Problem of Remedy: 
Responding to Treasury's (Lack of) Compliance With Adminis-
trative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements," 76 Geo. Wash. 
L. Rev. 1153, 1155-1156 (2008); Leandra Lederman, '"Civil'izing 
Tax Procedure: Applying General Federal Leaming to Statutory 
Notices of Deficiency," 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 183, 183 (1996); see 
also Jasper L. Cwnmings, Jr., The Supreme Court's Federal Tax 
]11risprudence 3, 7, 13 (2010). 
8E.g., Wing v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 17 (1983) (rejecting 
several APA-based challenges to regulations under section 612). 
But see Intenno1mtain, 2010 WL 1838297, at "20 n.15 (Halpern and 
Hohnes, fl., concurring) (criticizing Wing). 
9E.g., Vesco v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 101 (1979) (imposing, 
without statutory basis, a duty on the IRS to behave consistently 
as to similarly situated taxpayers). The IRS duty of consistency 
issue is complex and has spawned many cases and much 
conunentary. E.g., Steve R. Johnson, "An IRS Duty of Consis-
tency: The Failure of Conunon Law Making and a Proposed 
Statutory Solution," 77 Tenn. L. Rev. 563 (2010); Christopher M. 
Pietruszkiewicz, "Does the Internal Revenue Service Have a 
Duly to Treat Similarly Situated Taxpayers Similarly?" 74 U. 
Cin. L. Rev. 531 (2005); Lawrence Zelenak, "Should Courts 
Require the Internal Revenue Service to Be Consistent?" 38 Tax 
L. Rev. 411 (1985). 
10For example, the Tax Court has held the APA judicial 
review provisions inapplicable because the Tax Court is not. a 
govenunental "agency" for APA purposes. Nappi v. Co1111111s-
sioner, 58 T.C. 282, 284 (1972). The court's analysis missed the 
point since the actions under challenge were those of the IRS, 
not the Tax Court, and the IRS is an agency for APA purposes. 
5 U.S.C. section 551(1). 
TAX NOTES, August 23, 2010 
:, ' 
I 
-~ 
I 
~ 
~, t 
! 
·' 
. •"' 
Copious case law11 and commentaries12 have examined 
whether and how Chevron applies in the tax arena.13 
Another event was enactment of the Internal Revenue 
Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998.14 Several 
provisions of this landmark legislation - especially the 
collection due process rules15 - have presented impor-
tant admini.sb:ative law issues.16 Whether motivated by 
these or other events, commentators have increasingly 
focused on the interactions of tax and administrative 
law.17 
These interactions will continue to grow in signifi-
cance. Intermountain exemplifies the trend and will con-
tribute to it. It is to that case we now tum. 
· II. Intermountaitt and Its Context 
A. Background 
· Section 6501(a) provides that the IRS usually must 
~8sess tax liabilities within three years of the later of 
.When the tax return at issue was filed or was required to 
b_e filed. There are, however, many exceptions to the 
j.isual three-year s tatute of limitations,ts such as section 
gsOl(e)(l), which gives the IRS six years to assess income 
tax liabilities "if the taxpayer omits from gross income an 
amount properly includible therein which is in excess of 
2S percent of the amount of gross income stated _in the 
~~tum." Section 6229(c)(2) provides a similar exception 
~·.-· . .u E.g., Mayo Fo11nd. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 
568 F.3d 675, 679 (8th Cir. 2009), Doc 2009-13439, 2009 TNT 
112-75, cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 3353 (2010); Stobie Creek Inv. LLC 
v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 636, 668 (2008), Doc 2008-16870, 2008 
-~TNT 149-5; Lewis v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 48, 53-54 (2007), Doc 
2007-7925, 2007 TNT 61-15. 
12E.g., Ellen P. Aprill, "Muffled Cheuron: Judicial Review of 
Tax Regulations," 3 Fla. Tax. Rev. 51 (1996); Jolm F. Coverdale, 
'/Chevron's Reduced Domain: Judicial Review of Treasury Regu-
lations and Revenue Rulings After Mead," 55 Admin. L. Rev. 39 
(2003); .Kristin E. Hickman, "Of Lenity, Chevron, and KPMG," 26 
Va. Tax Rev. 905 (2007) . 
- -~- ~-- ~3Some in the tax community have sought to limit applica-
tion of Chevron in tax cases. E.g., Mitchell M. Gans, "Deference 
and the End of Tax Practice," 36 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 731 
(2002). 
', 
14P.L. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685. 
15Sections 6320 and 6330. 
~ . 16See, e.g., Robinette v. Commissioner, 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 
2006), Doc 2006-4491, 2006 TNT 46-11, rev'g 123 T.C. 85 (2004), 
Doc 2004-14878, 2004 TNT 140-17; Nick A. Zotos, "Service 
Collection Abuse of Discretion: What ls the Appropriate Stand-
ard of Review and Scope of the Record in Collection Due 
Process Appeals?" 62 Tax Law. 223 (2008). 
17E.g., Bryan T. Camp, "The Failure of Adversarial Process in 
the Administrative State," 84 Ind. L.J. 57 (2009); Danshera Cords, 
--- "Administrative Law and Judicial Review of Tax Collection 
Decisions," 52 St. Lo"is U. L.f. 429 (2008);.Diane L. Fahey, "Is the 
United States Tax Court Exempt From Administrative Law 
JuriSprudence When Acting as a Reviewing Court?"._ Clev. St. 
I:.. Rev. _ (forthcoming 2010). 
· · · 
18See, e.g., David M. Richardson, Jerome Borison, and Steve 
Johnson, Civil Tax Procedure 146-154 (2d ed. 2008). 
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for cases governed by the 1982 Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act partnership audit and litigation 
rules.19 
These exceptions undoubtedly apply when the tax-
payer omits enough taxable receipts, but it has been 
controversial whether they apply when the nnderstate-
ment arises instead from overstated basis of sold assets.20 
Case law on the section 6501(e) overstated basis issue is 
divided, but both the preponderance of the cases and the 
more authoritative cases are contrary to the Service's 
position.21 
Following a string of high-profile defeats in section 
6501(e) cases in 2009, Treasury issued the regulations in 
both temporary and proposed form.22 The temporary 
regulations aggressively were declared to apply to tax 
years still open to assessment on the date of issuance, 
with the intention that they apply to all pending cases, 
including those the taxpayers had won but in which the 
decisions had not yet become final.23 Both the new 
regulations and their effective date have been highly 
controversial from the start.24 
B. The l ntermountain O p inion s 
Intermountain involves what the IRS considers an 
abusive tax shelter involving overstated basis.25 Having 
19P.L. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982). For discussion of the TEFRA 
rules, see Richardson, Borison, and Johnson, s1tpra note 18, ch.6. 
The TEFRA statute of limitations under section 6229 supple-
ments rather than displaces the general statute of limitations 
under section 6501. E.g., Curr-Spec Partners LP v. Commissioner, 
579 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2009), Doc 2009-18226, 2009 TNT 154:-11, 
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3321 (2010). 
20Gain from dealing in property is taxable. Section 61(a)(2). 
Such gain is the excess of the amow1t realized from sale or other 
disposition over the taxpayer's basis in the property. Section 
lOOl (a). Thus, overstatement of basis leads to understatement of 
income. 
21See Steve R. Johnson, "What's Next in the Section 6501(e) 
Overstated Basis Controversy?" ABA Section of Tax'n News 
Quarterly, Fall 2009, p. 19 (summarizing the cases). 
22See T.D. 9466 (Sept. 28, 2009); Doc 2009-21297, 2009 TNT 
184-9. 
23Temp. reg. section 301.6501(e)-IT(b). ("The rules of this 
section apply to tax years with respect to.which the applicable 
period for assessing tax did not expire before September 24, 
2009.!') Being temporary, the new regulations expire in three 
years, by September 24, 2012. Section 301.6501(e)-IT(c).· The 
expectation is that the regulations, now in proposed and tem-
porary form; will have been finalized by then. 
21See Jeremiah Coder, "IRS Strikes Back Against Judicial 
Losses in Overstated Basis Cases," Tax Notes, Oct. 5, 2009, p. 19, 
Doc 2009-21733, or 2009 TNT 190-4. 
250ne sometimes gets the impression that the IRS loses 
perspective when a case involves a tax shelter. The end does not 
justify the means. Fundamental rules of tax administration 
shoula not be violated simply because the case involves a tax 
shelter. The Intermountain majority had this concern, see 2010 
WL 1838297 at *5. ("We find the [Service's] interpretation to be 
irreparably marred by circular, result-driven logic and the 
wishful notion that the temporary regulations should apply to 
this case because lntermo"ntain was involved in what [the JRS] 
believes was an abusive tax transaction. For these reasons, we 
refuse to accord respondent's interpretation deferential treat-
ment.") 
839 
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failed to assess within the normal three years, the IRS 
relied on the six-year limitations period. Less than a 
month before issuance of the temporary regulations, the 
Tax Court decided the statute of limitations issue in 
Intermounta.in's favor.26 Based on the new regulations, 
the IRS filed motions to vacate and for reconsideration of 
that decision. 
The Tax Court denied the Service's motions, unani-
mous in its holding against the IRS. The 13 judges fell 
into three camps, however, with 7 judges joining Judge 
Robert A. Wherry Jr. in exploring the possibility that the 
effective date provision as drafted did not effectuate 
Treasury's intention to reach not-yet-final decisions.27 
Although advancing a questionable "plain meaning" 
analysis, the majority chose not to· rest the decision on 
that ground.28 
Instead, the majority examined the substantive valid-
ity of the temporary regulations. Assuming arguendo that 
Chevron provides the governing standard,29 the majority 
concluded that the regs did not pass muster under 
Chevron step one30 or Brand X. The majority concluded 
that the Supreme Court's Colony decision a half century 
ago31- held that what is now section 6501(e) unambigu-
ously precludes the position taken in the temporary 
regulations.32 The majority also noted, but believed it 
u'T.C. Memo. 2009-195 (Sept. 1, 2009), Doc 2009-19672, 2009 
TNT 168-5. 
27See 2010 WL 1838297, at •4-6. One wonders how Treasury 
and the IRS felt when a majority of the Tax Court said the 
agencies misread their own regulations - probably much the 
same way the Tax Court felt when, a few years earlier, the 
Supreme Comt told the Tax Comt that it had misread its own 
rules; see B11llard v. Commissioner, 544 U.S. 40 (2005). 
28See 2010 WL 1838297, at •6. The majority's choice not to 
resolve the case on this ground was based in part on this 
consideration: "We also recognize that respondent could amend 
the temporary regulations' effective/applicability date provi-
sion and file renewed motions to reconsider and to vacate based 
on those amended provisions, thereby extending this dispute to 
yet another case." Id. at n.13. 
29Id. at •6. The majority took this tack to avoid a controversy 
that has split the Tax Court before. It is ahnost universally 
agreed that Chevron provides the controlling standard when 
specific authority tax regulations are challenged. E.g., Carlos v. 
Commissioner, 123 T.C. 275, 280 (2004). However, many Tax 
Court judges have been reluctant to apply Cllevron to general 
authority regulations. For example, in Swall.ows Holding, supra 
note 4, the majority applied the pre-Chevron, tax-specific Na-
tional Muffler case instead of C/levrorr, 126 T.C. at 131. Dissenters 
would have applied Chevron; Id., at 157 (Halpern, J., dissenting) 
and 175-176 (Holmes, J., dissenting). The circuit court did apply 
Chevron and reversed, 515 F.3d at 170. The Intenno1mtain major-
ity no doubt applied Chevron arguendo to avoid reopening this 
wound and comting similar reversal. The Tax Comt has taken 
this tack in other cases as well. E.g., Estate of Gerson v. Commis-
sioner, 127 T.C. 139, 154 (2006), Doc 2006-21771, 2006 TNT 206-15 
(en bane), 11/f d, 507 F.3d 435 (6th Cir. 2007). 
30Chewon U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council Inc., 467 U.S. 
837 (1984). 
31Colony Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958). 
32See 2010 WL 1838297, at *7-8. 
840 
unnecessary to rule on, the taxpayer's argument tha 
temporary regulations have impennissibly retro t ~e 
effect. 33 . active 
Four other judges concurred in an opinion penn d b i 
Judge Mary Ann Cohen. This concurrence would\ Y 
resolved the case on narrower grounds. Motions 8 have 
th S . ' t . 11 uc as e erv1ce s yp1ca y are granted only in unusual . 
cumstances,31 and an intervening statutory chan ~­
such a circumst~ce.35 Th~ concurrence would have t~i: 
however, that an mterverung regulatory change does ' 
· t th 1 I d th · · ffi · not nse o e same eve , an us is msu cient to warrant 
vacating or reconsidering.36 
Judges James S. Halpern and Mark V. Holmes co _ 
curred in the result only. These judges rejected t~ 
majority's eff_ectiv~ date37 and Chevron analyses3a bu~ 
would have uwalidated the temporary regulations 0 
procedural grounds. The APA applies to rulemaking b~ 
federal agencies, including Treasury.39 Unless a stated 
exception applies, regulations are validly promulgated 
only if they go through the notice-and-comment process 
prescribed .by 5 U.S:C. se:tioi: 553. In general, the agency 
must provide public notice m the Federal Register of its 
proposed rulemaking.40 The agency must offer interested 
parties the chance to submit comments and must set forth 
a "concise general statement of [the regulation's] basis 
and purpose."41 The regulation cannot be effective until 
at least 30 days after its publication in the Code of Federal 
Regulations.42 
The temporary regulations were not promulgated 
using this process. Nonetheless, the IRS defended the 
regulations' validity on two grounds: that they fell within 
the APA exception for merely interpretive rules43 and that 
Congress implicitly excepted temporary tax regulations 
from the notice-and-conunent requirement.44 · The 
Halpern/Holmes concurrence rejected both contentions, 
and it would have held the regulations procedurally 
invalid under the APA.45 
33Id. at '8. Courts recently have split as to the validity of 
another retroactive regulation section 1.752-6. Compnre $11111 v. 
United States, 552 F. Supp.2d 1167, 1185 (D. Colo. 2008), Doc 
2008-9012, 2008 TNT 80-10 (invalidating the regulation), n'V'd 011 
otlter grounds, 2010 WL 4872368 (10th Cir., July 23, 2010), wit/I 
Cemco Investors LLC v. United States, 515 F.3d 749, 752 (7th Cir. 
2008), Doc 2008-2695, 2008 TNT 27-8 (upholding reh·oactive 
apElication of the regulation). 
34See, e.g., Estate of Quick v. Co111111issio1ier, 110 T.C. 440, 441 
(1998), Doc 98-21021 or 98 TNT 125-9. 
35Alioto v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-199, Doc 2006-
19533 or 2006 TNT 181-7. 
36See 2010 WL 1838297 at *9. 
37Id. at •10-11. 
38Id. at •12-17. 
39See 5 U.S.C. section 551(1). 
405 U.S.C. section 553(b). 
415 U.S.C. section 553(c). 
425 U.S.C. section 553(d). 
43See 5 U.S.C. section 553(b)(A). . 
-wsee 2010 WL 1838297, at •17-22. 
45Important work on this issue has been done by Prof. 
Kristin Hickman. See Hickman, supra note 7; and H ickrnan, 
"Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury'::; (Lack _of) 
Compliance With Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking 
(Footnote continued 011 next page.) 
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C. Evaluation of the Issues 
All three opinions in lntermountain reflect distaste for 
what the judges viewed as overzealous use of the regu-
lations process.46 Issuing a regulation while a matter is in 
litigation seems like changing the rules while the game is 
being played. Applying that regulation retroactively to 
cases already decided smacks of changing the score after 
the game is ov.er. However, taxation is not a game but a 
matter of fundamental national import.47 Moreover, the 
objection to the IRS "bootstrapping" itself to victory48 is 
doctrinally misplaced. In both tax49 and nontaxso cases, 
courts have cast suspicion on agency interpretations 
apparently adopted to bootstrap the agency into victory 
in litigation. But this concern is weak when applied to 
otherwise valid regulations. The leading cases distin-
guish between bare agency litigating positions and liti-
gating positions supported by regulations.51 
Requirements," 82 N.D. L. Rev. 1727 (2007). The Halpern/ 
Hohnes concurrence frequently cited Hickman's articles. E.g., 
2010 WL 1838297 at *18, 19, 21, and 22. 
Other works exploring this issue include Jasper L. Cum-
mings, Jr., "Treasury Violates the APA?" Tax Notes, Oct. 15, 2007, 
p. 263, Doc 2007-21652, OF 2007 TNT 200-28; Naftali Z. Dem-
bitzer, "Beyond the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998: 
Perceived Abuses of the Treasury Department's Rulemaking 
Authority," 52 Tax Law. 501, 503, and 509-510 (1999); Juan F. 
Vasquez Jr. and Peter A. Lowy, "Challengiri.g Temporary Treas-
ury Regulations: An Analysis of the Administrative Procedure 
Act, Legislative Reenactment Doctrine, Deference, and Invalid-
ity," 3 Hous. Bus. & Tax L.J. 248, 249-254 (2003). 
46See, e.g., 2010 WL 1838297, at •4 (majodty opinion); id. at •9 
(Cohen, J., concurring) ("Th.is petitioner should not bear the 
burden of relitigating this case on a playing field unilaterally 
redesigned by the adverse party after petitioner prevailed at this 
level."); id. at *9 (Halpern and Holmes, JJ., concurring). 
47See Steve R. Johnson, "The Work Product Doctrine and Tax 
Accrual Workpapers," Tax Notes, July 131 2009, p. 155, Doc 
2009-13526, or 2009 TNT 131-9 (rejecting such analogies in 
urging reversal of the panel opinion in United States v. Textron 
Inc., 553 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008), rev'd, 577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2009), 
Doc 2009-18383, 2009 TNT 155-7 (en bane), cert. denied, 78 
U.S.L.W. 3375 (May 24, 2010)). The full circuit echoed this 
rejection on reversal. 577 F.3d at 31. _ 
48See, e.g., Coder, supra note 24, at p. 730 (quoting attorney 
and former Treasury official Christopher S. Rizek describing the 
te~orary regulations as "pure bootstrap"). 
E.g., Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554, 
562-563 (1991) (noting that the IRS had "not issued an authori-
tative, prelitigation interpretation") (emphasis added); Caterpillar 
Tractor Co. v. United States, 589 F.2d 1040, 1043 (Ct. Cl. 1978); 
Swallows Holding, supra note 4, at 148. 
50E.g., Sec11rities Ind. Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve 
Syst., 468 U.S. 137, 143-144 (1984); Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 
1338, 1350 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1270 (2000). B11t see 
Long Island Care at Home Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007) 
(deferring to an agency memorandum even though it had been 
preriared in anticipation of litigation). 
1Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 742-743 (1996); Bowen v. 
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988); Texaco Inc. v. 
United States, 528 F.3d 703, 710-711 (9th Cir. 2008); American Bar 
Association Section of Taxation, "Report of the Task Force on 
Judicial Deference," 57 Tax Law. 717, 759 (2004) ("positions taken 
in regulations are given full Chevron deference, even if a 
regulation is promulgated in response to pending litigation"). 
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Nonetheless, law is an intensely human operation. 
One can understand distaste for the aggressive (some 
would say abusive) position of Treasury and the IRS in 
the temporary regulations. Certainly, the judges partici-
pating in Intermountain shared this distaste. 
Although motivated by a common impulse, the Tax 
Court judges differed greatly on the doctrine by which to 
make that impulse legally operative. In my opinion, 
Judges Halpern and Holmes had the best view of the 
case. The omission of notice-and-comment is not justified 
by either of the grounds asserted by the IRS. The Serv-
ice's "merely interpretive" argument is hopeless, as 
shown in Section ill. 
The Service's argument that Congress excepted. tem-
porary tax regulations from APA notice-and-comment is 
better but probably not good enough . That argumen t 
runs along the following lines: Congress revised section 
7805 in 1988, adding subsection 7805(e).s2 In so doing, the 
IBS argued, Congress codified Treasury's practice of 
promulgating temporary regulations issu ed simulta-
neously with proposed regulations: "The trade-off was 
that any temporary regulations promulgated in this 
manner would no longer have unlimited life but instead 
would expire within three years from the date of i<>su-
ance."53 
1his is a variation of the "legislative bargain" ap-
proach to statutory interpretation. That approach sees 
legislation as the prodvct of compromise between com-
peting interest groups or values and posits that the role of 
the courts is to discern and give effect to the bargain 
struck in the legislature.54 
However, there are two problems with the Service's 
argument. First, the Service's description of the "trade-
off" may be incomplete. Why do temporary regulations 
exist at all? JYpically, temporary regulations are issued 
when there is a _need for immediate · gilldance. Such 
s ituations would fall within the APA's good-cause excep-
tion to the notice-and-comment requirements.55 Congress 
may have fashioned the current version of section 7805 in 
light of this understanding, which suggests that Congress 
expected that temporary tax regulations would need to 
fit into the good-cause exception in order to avoid 
notice-and-comment requirement.56 However, there was 
52Tedutical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, P.L. 
100-647, section 6232, 102 Stat. 3342. 
53IRS brief, supra note 1, at 20. 
54See, e.g., Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987); 
St11pak-Thrall v. United States, 89 F.3d 1269, 1293 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(Moore, J., concurring), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1090 (1997). 
555 U.S.C. section 553(b)(B) (the r,totice-and-comment rules 
do not apply "when . the agency for good cause finds (and 
incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons 
therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure 
thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public 
interest"). 
56
"Congress may have intended [section 7805) to apply only 
to temporary regulations that already fit into an exception to the 
APA, especially considering that a need for temporary regula-
tions would nor111ally be expected in emergency or good-cause 
situations." 2010 WL 1838297, at *20 n.15 (Halpern and Holmes, 
JJ., concurring). 
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no emergency or other good-cause justification for the 
temporary regs at issue in Intermountain - apart from the 
fact that the tide of litigation had turned against the IRS. 
Indeed, neither the Treasury decision accompanying the 
regulations nor the Service's Intermountain briefs asserted 
the good-cause exception. 
Second, the Service's section 7805 contention is based 
on inference, not explicit text. However, Congress has 
provided that other statutes may modify APA require-
ments only expressly, not by implication.57 The IRS may 
have been trying obliquely to address this problem when 
it argued that "section 7805(e) provides a specific statu-
tory exemption to the general statutory requirements of 
the APA,"58 supporting its theory with citations to the 
canon of statutory construction that specific provisions 
control over general provisions.59 However, "specific" in 
this context is not synonymous with 11express," and 
canons "are not mandatory rules."60 Indeed, a recent 
high-profile tax case rejected use of the canon of specific 
controls over general to decide the controversy there at 
issue.61 
The arguments advanced in the other Intermountain 
opinions do not strike me as persuasive. First, as pointed 
out by Judges Halpern and Holmes, the regulations' 
effective date provision is ambiguous, not plain.62 The 
provision might be read to mean "open under the normal 
three-year period," as the Intermountain majority read it,63 
or it might mean 11open under the six-year period, as that 
period is extended by this regulation,11 as Treasury and 
the IRS intended.64 An agency1s construction of its own 
ambiguous regulation is entitled to deference.65 
Second, the majority is wrong about its Chevron step 
one analysis. Colony did not say that its result was 
unambiguously commanded by the statute.66 Moreover, 
Colony construed section 275(c) of the code of 1939, a 
predecessor of current section 650l(e), and the current 
575 U.S.C. section 559; see also Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 
154-155 (1999) (stressing the importance of uniformity in apply-
ing the APA). This argument is presented here in summary form 
because it is not the central concern of this report. A longer 
explanation would address the "legislative entrenchment" 
question, i.e., the extent to which one Congress can impose 
roadblocks on the amendment of a statute by a later Congress. 
See, e.g., Amandeep S. Grewal, "Legislative Entrenchment Rules 
in the Tax Law," 62 Admin. L. Rev. _ (forthcoming 2010). 58IRS brief, supra note 1, at 20. 59For discussion of this canon, see Steve R. Johnson, "When 
General Statutes and Specific Statutes Conflict," State Tax Notes, 
Jul)' 12, 2010, p. 113, Doc 2010-11554, or 2010 STT 132-3. 
6
°Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001). 
61 Xilinx Inc. et al. v. Commissioner, 598 F.3d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 
2009), Doc 2009-11943, 2009 TNT 100-9. 
62See 2010 WL 1838297 at *10-11. 
63Id. at *5-6. 
64See IRS brief, supra note 1, at 5-7; CC-2010-010 (Nov. 23, 
2009), Doc 2010-13821, 2010 TNT 120-20. 
65E.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Stinson v. 
United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44-46 (1993); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & 
Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 412-418 (1945). 
66See 357 U.S. at 33 ('1it cannot be said that the [statutory] 
language is unambiguous"). 
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statute arguably is somewhat more congenial to the 
Service's position. In the government's view: 
When Congress enacted the 1954 Internal Revenue 
Code, it was aware of the disagreement among the 
courts that existed at the time regarding the proper 
scope of section 275. The changes that Congress 
enacted [in 1954] predated ... Colony and were 
intended to resolve the matter for the future. There-
fore, by amending the Internal Revenue Code, 
including the addition of a special definition of 
"gross income" with respect to a trade or business, 
Congress effectively limited what ultimately be-
came the holding in Colony, to cases subject to 
section 275(c).67 
Finally, the pre-Intermountain case law refutes Inter-
mountain's expansive reading of Colony. The IRS won 
some of the cases on the overstated basis issue decided 
after Colony.68 Further, even cases the IRS lost stopped 
short of saying that Colony had found the statute unam-
biguous. Bakersfield conceded that the Service's interpre-
tation was reasonable (although ultimately erroneous)69 
and stated that the IRS "may have the authority to 
promulgate a reasonable reinterpretation of an ambigu-
ous provision of the tax code, even if its interpretation 
runs contrary to the Supreme Court's 'opinion as to the 
best reading' of that provision."70 Salman Ranch involved 
a 2-2 split of the judges, but the IRS lost because the two 
judges agreeing with it were a trial judge and an appel-
late judge while the two judges agreeing with the tax-
payer were both appellate judges.n 
There are two possibilities. Either the judges in these 
prior cases failed to notice that Colony had settled the 
issue, or more likely, the Intermountain majority over-
played its hand in characterizing Colony's holding. 
Third, the narrow ground offered by Judge Cohen and 
the judges joining her is dubious. Yes, a statute outranks 
a regulation. But, as developed below in Section III.A.l, a 
validly promulgated legislative regulation has the force 
of law.72 Thus, the distinction offered by Judge Cohen's 
concurrence is not a meaningful difference. 
67T.D. 9466, supra note 22, at 552; see also CC&F Western 
Operations Ltd. P'ship, 273 F.3d 402, 406 n.2 (1st Cir. 2001), Doc 
2001-30601, 2001 TNT 239-11. ("Whether Colony's main holding 
carries over to section 6501(e) is at least doubtful.") 
68Burks v. United States, 2009 WL 2600358 (N.D. Tex. June 13, 
2009); Home Concrete & Supply LLC v. United States, 599 F. 
Supp.2d 678 (E.D.N.C. 2008); Brandon Ridge Partners v. United 
States, 2007-2 U.S. Tax Cas. para. 50,573 (M.D. Fla. 2007). 
69Bakersfield Energy Partners v. Commissioner, 568 F.3d 767, 775 
(9th Cir. 2009), Doc 2009-13801, 2009 TNT 115-10. 
70Id. at 778 (citing Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982-983). 
71 Salmun Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 573 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 
2009), Doc 2009-17311, 2009 TNT 145-13 (2-1 decision), rev'g 79 
Fed. Cl. 189 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 2007), Doc 2007-25341, 2007 TNT 221-12. 
72E.g., Justice Department, Attorney General's Manual on the 
Administrative Procedure Act 30 at n.3 (1947); Robert A. Anthony, 
11 A Taxonomy of Federal Agency Rules," 52 Admin. L. Rev. 1045, 
1046 (2000); Peter L. Strauss, "The Rulemaking Continuum," 41 
Duke L.J. 1463, 1464 (1992). The Attorney General's Manual is "the 
Government's own most authoritative interpretation of the 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
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III. Legislative Versus In terpretive Tax Regulations 
The APA notice-and-conunent rules are important. 
They are "the procedure by which the persons affected by 
legislative rules are enabled to communicate their con-
cerns in a comprehensive and systematic fashion to 
legislating agency."73 This allows participation by the 
governed and decreases the chance of error by the 
agency.74 
There are exceptions to the APA's command that 
regulations go through notice-and-comrnent. One excep-
tion arguably relevant here operates when the regulation 
is interpretive, not legislative, in nature.75 In attempting 
to deflect Intermountain' s AP A argument, the IRS relied 
in part on this exception.76 Indeed, this is a position that 
Treasury and the IRS often take as to tax regulations.77 
The government's position is defective. The IRS is 
trying to have its cake and eat it, too, by claiming that (1) 
the regulations did not have to go through notice-and-
comment because they are interpretive, not legislative, 
yet (2) the regulations have the force of law even though 
they are not legislative. The IRS is wrong on both ends: 
The regulations at issue are legislative (thus had to go 
through notice-and-conunent) and lack force of law (and 
thus do not reverse the case law adverse to the IRS) if 
they are merely interpref'.!-ve. . 
A. Legislative, Not Interpretive 
The key difference between legislative and interpre-
tiv:e regulations is that the former mak~ binding law 
while the latter do not. The IRS wants the temporary 
regulations at issue to make law binding the courts and 
compelling them to reverse the former thrust of the 
section 6501(e) case law. These points are developed 
below, after which I consider and reject the Service's two 
arguments for treating the regulations as merely interpre-
tive:·that they are general, not specific authority, and that 
they were derived by statutory interpretation. · 
1. 'Force of law' nature of legislative regulations. Courts 
have had difficulty drawing lines to distinguish legisla-
tive regulations from interpretive ones.78 The core of 
APA . . . which [the Supreme CoUit has] repeatedly given great 
weight." Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 218 
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
73Hoctor v. USDA, 82 F.3d 165, 171 (7th Cir. 1986). 
74See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, "Models of Administrative Ac-
tion," 72 Va. L. Rev. 363, 364 (1986) (stating that the APA's 
rulemaking approach "loosely resembles the legislative proc-
ess"); Mark Seidenfeld, "A Civic Republican Justification for the 
Bureaucratic State," 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1511, 1560 (1992) (main-
taining that the notice-and-comment process "is specifically 
geared to advance the requirements of civic republican theory" 
though perhaps "only to a limited extent," given the procedures 
agencies actually use). · 
755 U.S.C. section 553(b). 
76See IRS brief, supra note 1, at 21-23. 
. ' 
77The IRS takes the position that most Treasury regulations 
are interpretive in nature. Internal Revenue Manual section 
32.1.5.4.7.5.1; see also Hickman, supra note 45, at 1760-1773. 
. 
78See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce Jr., "Distinguishing Legislative 
Rules From Interpretative Rules," 52 Admin. L. Rev. 547, 547 
(2000) ("For over fifty years, courts and commentators have 
<Footnote continued in next column.) 
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distinction is reasonably clear, however, and suffices to 
resolve the Intermountain issue. Legislative regulations 
have the force of law - that is, they make binding law or 
change the law. Interpretive regulations do not have force 
of law; they merely inform the public of what the agency 
believes the statute means.79 
Because it hears the largest number of cases involving 
federal agencies, the D.C. Circuit is sometimes called the 
second most important federal court.so The D.C. Circuit's 
decision in American Mining Congresss1 is among the most 
influential on the legislative/interpretive distinction.s2 
The decision offered the following hallmarks of legisla-
tive rule status: 
(1) whether in the absence of the rule there would 
not be an adequate legislative basis for enforcement 
action or other agency action to confer benefits or 
ensure the performance of duties, (2) whether the 
agency has published the rule in the Code of 
Federal Regulations, (3) whether the agency has 
explicitly invoked its general legislative authority, 
or (4) whether the rule effectively amends a prior 
legislative rule.s3 
Significantly, the decision added: "If the answer to any 
of these questions is affirmative, we have a legislative, 
not an interpretive rule. "B4 
Under this test, the temporary regs at issue in Inter-
mountain are legislative, not interpretive.as Not just one, 
struggled to identify, and to apply, criteria that are appropriate 
to distinguish between legislative and interpretative rules. The 
results have not been pretty.") (citing cases). 
For additional discussion of the "legislative versus interpre-
tive" issue, see Robert A. Anthony, "Which Agency Interpreta-
tions Should Bind Citizens and Courts?" 7 Yale/. Reg. 1 (1990); 
Anthony, "'Interpretive' Rules, 'Legislative' Rules and 'Spuri-
ous' Rules: Lifting the Smog," 8 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 1 (1994); 
Anthony, "Three Settings iri Which Nonlegislative Rules Should 
Not Bind," 53 Admin. L. Rev. 1313 (2001); and William Funk, 
"When Is a 'Rule' a Regulation? Marking a Clear Line Between 
Nonlegislative Rules and Legislative Rules," 54 Admin. L. Rev. 
659 (2002). . 
79E.g., Clrn;sler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-302 (1979). 
80
"In administrative law comers, some say that D.C. Circuit 
cases carry equal - if not more - precedential weight than 
Supreme Court decisions." Jim Rossi, "Does the Solicitor Gen-
eral Advantage Thwart the Rule of Law in the Administrative 
State?" 28 Fl. St. U.L. Rev. 459, 460 (2000). 
81American Mining Congress v. Mine Safeti; & Health Admin., 
995 F.2d 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
82See, e.g., Hickman, supra note 45, at 1766 (calling American 
Mining Congress the "dominant standard"); Pierce, supra note 78, 
at 548 (stating that American Mining Congress "does an excellent 
job of identifying all of the [important) criteria"); Richard J. 
Pierce Jr., Administrative Law Treatise 454 (5th ed. 2010) (noting 
that Americnn Mining Congress has been adopted in six circuits, 
including the Tenth Circuit, to which I11ten11ountain is appeal-
abl~. , · 
American Mining Congress, 995 F.2d at 1112. Subsequent 
cases have modified. these indicia at the margins. See 2010 WL 
1838297, at •19 (Halpern and Holmes, JJ., concurring). 
~95 F.2d at 1112 (emphasis added). · 
85Sig:nificantly, temporary tax regulations have the same 
weight as final regulations. E.g., U11ionBanCal v. Commissioner, 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
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but two of the indicia are present. The first indicium is 
present because, absent the regulations, the IRS would 
have no adequate legal basis for applying section 6501(e) 
to overstated basis situations. Treasury and the IRS were 
not simply informing the public of their view of the 
statute - that view was already well known from the 
many cases (most of them losses86) in which the govern-
ment had advanced it. The whole point of issuing the 
regulations was to change the law and bind the courts by 
administratively reversing the law as articulated by the 
weight of the cases.87 
The third indicium also is present. In paragraph 1 of 
the amendment to 26 C.F.R. part 301 introduced by the 
new regulations, Treasury explicitly invoked its general 
legislative authority under section 7805.88 Section 7805(a) 
is a general conferral of authority, and "the general 
consensus now is that a general rulemaking power 
confers delegated power [on agencies] to adopt binding 
legislative rules."89 
The regulations at issue in Intermountain seek to make 
or change binding law, not merely to inform the public of 
Treasury's construction of the statute. Therefore, they are 
legislative in nature and so do not qualify for the 
interpretive regulations exception to the APA notice-and-
comrnent requirements. We now tum to the Service's 
rejoinders to thaf argument. 
2. General authority versus specific authority. The Ser-
vice's first rejoinder in Intermountain9o relies on an error 
that Treasury and the IRS have perpetuated for decades 
and that taxpayers and even courts have too often 
accepted.91 This error equates interpretive regulations 
with regulations issued under the general authority of 
section 7805(a) and equates legislative regulations with 
regulations issued under specific authority within the 
code section at issue. Because the temporary regs were 
issued under section 7805(a) and not under sections 6501 
or 6229, the IRS claims they are interpretive. 
The problem is that the equations on which the 
Service's argument rests are wrong, and the mere fact 
305 F.3d 976, 985 (9th Cir. 2002), Doc 2002-21272, 2002 TNT 
182-11; E. Nonnan Peterson Marital Trust v. Commissioner, 78 F.3d 
795, 798 (2d Cir. 1996). 
86E.g., Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 573 F.3d 1362 (Fed 
Cir. 2009); Bakersfield Energy Partners v. Commissioner, 568 F.3d 
767 ~9th Cir. 2009). 
8 As the Halpern/Holmes concurrence notes, the IRS "wants 
us to vacate our otherwise final decision, which he could not 
logically ask us to do without implying that the [Treasury] 
intended that these new rules have the force of law." 2010 WL 
1838297 at *20; cf United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 234 (2005) 
(Stevens, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part) ("Be-
cause [the sentencing guidelines] are binding on judges, we 
have consistently held that the Guidelines have the force and 
effect of laws."). 
882009-43 IRB at 552. 89Michael Asimow, "Public Participation in the Adoption of . 
Temporary Tax Regulations," 44 Tax Law. 343, 354 (1991) (citing 
"emf.hatic holdings" in several nontax cases). 
9 See 2010 WL 1838297 at *18-20. . 
91See John F. Coverdale,. "Court Review of Tax Regulations 
and Revenue Rulings in the Chevron Era," 64 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
35, 52 (1995). 
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that much of the tax community has long recited these 
equations without question does not make them right 92 
The classification of a regulation as legislative or int~r­
pretive depends on whether the regulation has the force 
of law, not on which code section the regulation was 
promulgated under. Tax regulations that make bindin 
law are legislative whether they are promulgated unde~ 
specific authority or general authority.93 
Nevertheless, the IRS argued in Intermountain as fol-
lows: 
Regulations that are not interpretive but rather 
legislative or substantive generally result from stat-
utes that specifically direct the [Treasury] to pre-
scribe regulations under a provision of the 
law . .. . In these situations, Congress simply pro-
vides an end result without any guidance as to how 
to achieve the end result. Regulations issued pur-
suant to this type of blank slate grant of authority 
are issued to create substantive law necessary to 
achieve the end result commanded by Congress, 
thus they are legislative or substantive regulations. 
In contrast, the statutory provisions in this case, 
sections 6229 and 6501, do not direct the Secretary 
to issue regulations ... . There is no mandate from 
Congress requiring the [Treasury] to take any action 
other than administer the provisions.94 
In my opinion that argument is "".eak. First, the "blank 
slate" description of specific-authority regulations is 
overinclusive. As shown below, the statutes authorizing 
such regulations often impose specific limits within 
which Treasury is to exercise the delegated power.95 
Second, the "no mandate" description is underinclu-
sive and is not limited to general authority regulations. 
Treasury sometimes does not issue regulations even 
when au thorized to do so by sp ecific authority provi-
sions,96 which w1dercuts. the practical significance of any 
"mandate." Moreover, Chevron and other cases have 
made it clear that Congress confers power, not just by 
express delegations, but also implicitly by leaving gaps 
for the agency to fill. 97 The agency can make binding 
rules in either case. An implicit delegation by means of 
oncarr v. United States, 560 U.S. __, 2010 WL 2160783, at *13 
(June 1, 2010) (Alito, J., dissenting) ("A bad argwnent does not 
im~rove with repetition."). 
3See, e.g., Shala/a v. Guernsei; Mem. Hosp., 514 U.S. 'i57, 99 
(1995); American Hosp. Ass'11 v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 651, 655-656 (7th 
Cir. 1990); National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 
688, 695 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975); Natio11nl 
Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). 94IRS brief, supra note 1, at 22. 
95See subpart V.B.2. . 
96For example, the sorry saga of Treasury's failure to issue 
debt versus equity regulations under section 385 is well known. 
See, e.g., Glenn E. Coven, Robert J. Peroni, and Richard Cr~w­
ford Pugh, Cases and Materials on Taxation of Business Enterprrses 
132 ~2d ed. 2002). 9: 9 E.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842; Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 19 ' 
231 (1974). 
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leaving a gap to be filled is, if anything, even more of a 
11no mandate" situation than a general authority delega-
tion. 
Third, and most importantly, even if the "blank slate" 
versus "no mandate" categories had been accurately 
described by the IRS, it is not clear why the distinction 
would matter. Why does the fact that Treasury could 
have chosen not to issue a particular regulation mean 
that when it does issue a regulation it may skip notice-
and-comment? The APA prescribes notice-and-comment 
both to allow the governed to express their views and to 
reduce the chance of the agency making a policy error. 
Those reasons apply as fully when an agency issues a 
regulation Congress didn't require as when it issues a 
regulation Congress did require. 
3. Process of interpretation. In Hoctor, a nontax case, the 
Seventh Circuit took a different tack to defining interpre-
tive regulations. In the opinion for the court, Chief Judge 
Richard A. Posner wrote that a regulation is interpretive 
11only if it can be derived from the [statute or other 
governing law] by a process reasonably described as · 
interpretation ."98 
In the cases litigated before issuance of the temporary 
regulations, the IRS advanced plausible (though usually 
unavailing) statutory interpretation arguments for its 
view that basis overstatements are within the ambit of 
the six-year limitations period.99 Thus, the government 
could argue that the regulations are derived from sec-
tions 6501 and 6229 "by a process reasonably described 
as interpretalion."100 
There are three problems with this argument. First, it 
is not clear that Hoctor was providing a universal or even 
general test. Even if it was, Hoctor has not been widely 
followed. Certainly, American Mining has been far more 
influential. 
,. ·second, Hoctor is in tension with the established 
. . distinction between legislative and interpretive regula-
-· .. tiOns. One can imagine situations in which a regulation 
c.ould be derived via a process of interpretation (so would 
be · interpretive under Hoctor) but would make binding 
law (so would be legislative under the established defi-
nition). A regulation cannot be both legislative and 
interpretive, making Hoctor at odds with the dominant 
standard.101 
• 
98Hoctor, 82 F.3d at 170. 
,. 
99See, e.g., Salman Ranch, 573 F.3d at 1371-1372 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(describing the Service's statutory arguments). 
·~•.: 100 Although only in passing and without citation to Hoctor, 
the IRS invoked this argument in Inten11011ntain. IRS brief, supra 
note 1, at 23. ("Under any applicable legal test or measure, the 
temporary regulations are interpretive because they merely 
. interpret an ambiguous phrase in the relevant statutes and are 
· thus exempt from the APA's notice and comment require-
ments.") · 
. .;,; 
101The root of the problem is that the Hoctor approach applies 
an ordinary, vemacuJar meaning to "interpretation" and its 
· deJ:ivative terms. But "interpretive" as used in the "interpretive 
versus legislative" dichotomy is a term of art. See generally Yule 
~, Stat11tory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends, 
~. (Cong. Res. Serv. No. 97-589) (rev. Aug. 31, 2008) (distin-
. guishing between terms of art and wor_ds of ordinary meaning). 
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Third, the argument that the regs at issue were derived 
by a process of interpretation might work better on a 
clean slate than in the current posture. It would have 
been easier to say that the temporary regs were derived 
via interpretation before the majority of the cases (and the 
most authoritative of the cases) rejected the interpreta-
tions on which the position is based. 
In short, I believe the new regulations are legislative in 
character. They do not qualify for the interpretive rule 
exception to the APA notice-and-comment requirements. 
B. Nonbinding if Only In terpretive 
Back to the basics. Legislative regulations make bind-
ing law; interpretive regulations do not. Thus, if -
contrary to the points in Section ID.A above - the IBS 
were to prevail in its argument that the temporary 
regulations are merely interpretive, the IRS would have 
won the battle but lost the war. The interpretive tempo-
rary regulations woulcj. not be binding on the courts.102 
Being just the opinion of the IRS, they would be entitled 
to a respectful hearing, which wouldn't count for much. 
The courts have already heard the Service's position and 
have rejected it, for the most part. · 
The IRS, however, maintains that "interpretative rules 
can be implemented by interpretative Treasury regula-
tions that are decreed to have force of law but that still 
qualify as interpretative rules exempt from the APA,"103 
citing National Restaurant.104 
This can't be right for three reasons. First, the argu-
ment igriores th.e fundamental trade-off embodied ii) the 
APA notice-and-comment requirements. ''Legislative 
rules carry the force and effect of law, which is why the 
APA ordinarily subjects these rules to public notice and 
comment before they become final."105 Precisely because 
they are not binding, the harm posed by a misguided 
interpretive regulation is far less than the harm that 
would be posed by a misguided legislative regulation, 
which is why it is safe to exempt interpretive, but not 
legislative, rules from notice-and-comment. The Service's 
position would imbalanc~ th.e congressional calculation 
by making a rule binding while dispensing with the 
safeguard that makes binding administrative power an 
acceptable risk.106 
102See, e.g., William Ftmk, "A Primer on Nonlegislative 
RuJes," 53 Admin. L. Rev. 1321, 1332-1333 (2001). 
l03JRS brief, supra note 1, at 21. 
104National Restaurant Ass'n v. Simon, 411 F. Supp. 993, 999 
(D.D.C. 1976). 105Kristin E. Hickman, "IRB Guidance: The No Man's Land 
of Tax Code Interpretation," 2009 Mich. St. L. Rev. 239, 253-254. 10611So long as the administrative state remains such a 
pervasive and coercive force in society, one shouJd think very 
hard before eliminating legal doctrines that provide checks on 
the arbitrariness of agency action ... . [We) must not divert the 
focus entirely away from the need·to ensure that agencies act 
not only within acceptable legal and political bounds, but aJso 
exercise their discretion in a deliberative manner." Mark Seiden-
feld, "Demystifying Deossification: · Rethinking Recent Pro-
posaJs to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment 
RuJemaking," 75 Tex. L. Rev. 483, 489-490 (1997). 
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Second, in trying to have it both ways, the IRS would 
put interpretive regulations in a preferred position rela-
tive to legislative regulations. From the agency's stand-
point, interpretive regulations would have the same 
benefit (binding effect) as legislative regulations but 
without the same inconvenience (having to go through 
notice-and-comment). As a practical matter, legislative 
regulations could become redundancies, the legislative 
category being swallowed by the interpretive category. It 
is hard to believe Congress intended such an outcome. 
Third, National Restaurant is weak authority. It is an 
old trial court decision that is incompletely reasoned, 
little cited, and difficult to reconcile with current doc-
trine. National Restaurant acknowledged that controlling 
circuit law distinguished between legislative and inter-
pretive rules based on the binding nature of the former 
and the nonbinding nature of the latter.107 The court still 
rejected a "no notice-and-comment" challenge to a rev-
enue ruling that created new record-keeping and report-
ing requirements because the revenue ruling did so " by 
interpreting the meaning of already binding regulations, 
rather than by creating any new obligations."1os To justify 
the holding, the court said that in its view, "it _is a ruling 
of the sort that Congress intended the [IRS] to make as a 
matter of administrative construction, not subject to the 
normal rulemaking requiremerlts."109 This is clairvoy-
ance, not reasoning. 
IV. Inten1101mtain and Brai1d X 
The temporary regulations are an attempt by an 
agency to reverse judicial statutory interpretation. Can 
agencies do that?110 Brand X is a key case. The Supreme 
Court held that a regulation trumps prior judicial inter-
pretations as long as two conditions are met: the regula-
tion qualifies for Chevron deference, and the prior cases 
did not say their results were commanded by an unam-
biguous statute.111 · 
The Intermoimtain majority concluded that . section 
6501(e) unambiguously precludes the Service's position 
(thus defeating Chevron deference) and that the Supreme 
Court had so held in Colony. As noted in Section Il.C, I 
disagree with these conclusions. It will be interesting to 
see whether future decisions embrace or reject them. 
Brand X is a comparativeli recent decision, and im-
portant questions it raises still must be resolved.112 Inter-
107 411 F. Supp. at 999. 
108Jd. 
109Jd. 
11
°For discussion of this issue in the context of the check-the-
box regulations as to entity classification, see Gregg Polsky, 
"Can Treasury Overrule the Supreme Court?" 84 B.U. L. Rev. 185 
(2004). The courts, however, have upheld the check-the-box 
regulations. E.g., Littriel/o v. United Stales, 484 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 
2007), Doc 2007-9567, 2007 TNT 73-16. 
111545 U.S. at 982. 
112Hundreds of cases have cited Brand X, and a substantial 
literature exists as to it. E.g., Mercado-Zazueta v. Holder, 580 F.3d 
1102, 1113-1115 (9th CiL 2009); Doug Geyser, Note, "Courts Still 
'Say What the Law ls': Explaining the Ftmctions of the Judiciary 
and Agencies After Brand X," 106 Col11m. L. R~. 2129 (2006). 
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mountain and comparable cases may help on some of 
these questions but not on others. Three such questions 
are addressed below. 
A. What Intennountain-Type Cases M ay Clarify 
The first question is the "magic words" issue. The 
second prong of the Brand X test requires that the holding 
in a prior case was not based on an unambiguous statute. 
Is the second prong satisfied only if the prior case 
expressly used "unambiguous" or a synonym in charac-
terizing the statute? Courts have grappled with similar 
issues in other areas of administrative law. For example, 
the APA distinguishes between informal and formal 
agency rulemaking (and agency adjudication). When a 
regulation may be promulgated informally, the notice-
and-comment process suffices. When formal rulemaking 
is required, additional procedw·al steps must be taken.113 
Formal rulemaking is requiJ:ed when the underlying 
statute states that the rules in question "are re-
quired . .. to be made on the record after opportunity for 
an agency hearing.''114 Must precisely or essentially these 
words appear in the statute, or may a court hold that 
formal rulemaking is triggered by some less exact statu-
tory language? The case law is not wholly consistent.11s 
The Supreme Court seems to have embraced the former 
alternative, the magic words approach.116 
But context is everything in law,117 and the magic 
words question need not be handled the same way for 
Brand X purposes as for informal versus formal rulemak-
ing purposes.118 Intermountain rejected the contention 
that the word "unambiguous" need appear in the prior 
cases that a regulation is trying to reverse.n9 I think it 
was right to do so. 
Colony and some other precedents were decided be-
fore Brand X and even Chevron were handed down. 
Unless they are charged with a burden of precognition, 
the justices and judges deciding those cases had no 
reason to know that their omitting particular words from 
their opinions could · affect the allocation of power be-
tween courts and agencies. · 
113See 5 U.S.C. sections 556 and 557. 
1145 U.S.C. section 553(c). 
115See Alfred C. Aman Jr., Administrative Law and Process, sec. 
3.03 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing both formal agency adjudication 
and formal agency rulemaking). 
116E.g., United States v. Florida East Const I<ailway, 410 U.S. 224, 
241-242 (1973). 
117See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal 
Courts and the Law, 37 (1997). 
118For instance, the courts freely dispense with the "consis-
tent meaning" canon of statutory construction when the same 
word appears in substantively different statutory contexts. See 
Steve R. Johru;on, "Supertext and Consistent Meaning," State 
Tax Notes, May 25, 2009, p. 675, Doc 2009-9545, or 2009 STf 99-4. 
rnlsee 2010 WL 1838297, at "8 n.22 ("We agree . . . with the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which stated that 
we ... do not hold that a court must say in so many magic 
words that its holding is the only permissible interpretation of 
the statute in order for that holding to be binding on an 
agency."') (quoting Fernandez v. Keisler, 502 F.3d 337, 347 (4th Cir. 
2007)). 
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Thus, the test under Brand X should be whether the 
prior cases, fairly read, suggest a view that the statute is 
unambiguous, not that the word "unambiguous" actu-
ally appear in the prior cases. If that construction pre-
vails, Intermountain will have contributed to clarifying 
Brand x.120 
Unfortunately, the Intermountain majority misapplied 
this approach. The majority read Colony to hold the 
statute to be unambiguous based on the legislative his-
tory, citing parts of the opinion calling the history "per-
suasive evidence" and saying that it "show.s to [the 
majority's] satisfaction" that Congress intended the result 
reached.121 This quoted language surely reflects a comfort 
l,evel exceeding 50 percent, but it strikes me as falling 
short of unambiguous. 
. Colony can be compared with the prior judicial inter-
pretation at issue in Brand X. In Brand X the Ninth Circuit 
held against the Federal Communications Commission 
because the agency's position was incompatible with the 
prior judicial interpretation of the governing statute in 
AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland.122 The Supreme Court 
reversed the Nirlth Circuit irl. Brand X, findirlg that the 
Portland court had not treated the underlying statute as 
unambiguous but had "held only that [its readirlg was] 
the best reading of" the statute.123 Similarly, the Colony 
opinion seems to me to reach only a "best readirlg" 
~onclusion, not an "unambiguous" conclusion. 
B. What Intennountain-Type Cases May Not Clarify 
One unsettled question from Brand Xis what should 
be done if the conclusions reached by the prior case on 
whether the statute is ambiguous are insupportable. 
What if the p recedent declared the statute to be unam-
biguous, but better analysis would have called it ambigu-
ous, and vice versa? 
''. I don't think Jntermountain presents either of these 
situations. In my view, the predecessor of sectio~ 6501(e) 
·-.~""'.'--~-"Vas ambiguous on whether basis overstatements are 
:·,!· covered, and current section 6501(e)· remains so; and 
£Ontrary to Intermountain, Colony cannot be read as de-
clat ing the statute to unambiguously exclude basis over-
statements. 
:, But what if I am right about the first of these conclu-
. .. . ~ions and wrong about the second? In other words, what 
.;:.i j£ Colony ei;roneously treated an ambiguous statute as 
" · unambiguous? In that case, future courts would either 
have to reject Brand X protection for the new regulations 
even though the Colony Court was wrong about arnbigu-
. i,ty, or protect the regulations under Brand X on the 
ground that Colony's conclusion was wrong. The choice 
courts make between these alternatives would clarify the 
in1plementation of the Brand X rule. 
t~.: 
. \-\ ~. 
r. ·· 1zosee generally Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman, 
- !!.Chevron's Domain,". 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 917 (2001); Note, "Imple-
menting Brand X: What CoWlts as a Step One Holding?" 119 
·Harv. L. Rev. 1532 (2006) (both exploring alternative approaches 
· t'o this issue). . 
"· 
121357 U.S. at 33 and 36. 
. 1· 122216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000). 
· '-• . 
123545 U.S. at 984 (emphasis in original) . 
.. : . 
\ .. l'. 
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However, Intermountain-type cases are not a good 
vehicle for achievirlg that clarification. Colony was a 
Supreme Court decision, and lower courts are not author-
ized to declare Supreme Court decisions wrongly rea-
soned.124 Thus, this clarification would be achieved only 
if the Supreme Court itself heard and decided Intermoun-
tain or a future case in this line. Given the number of tax 
cases the Supreme Court takes each year,125 and the other 
important tax issues that vie for the Court's attention, this 
scenario is unlikely.126 
I also doubt that Intermountain-type cases, or indeed 
cases of any type, will lead to resolution of another of 
Brand X's ambiguities: whether the clarity of the statute is 
to be determirled only from the statutory text or whether 
legislative history also may be examined as part of the 
inquiry. The Intermountain majority believed that resort to 
legislative history is properly part of the process,127 while 
Judges Halpern and Holmes believed text to be control-
ling, saying that "Colony's resort to legislative history in 
the first place shows a gap that [Treasury] is ipso facto . 
allowed to fill."128 
The Halpern/Holmes concurrence said that this am-
biguity in Brand X is "not [an issue] that we as a trial 
court can possibly solve on our own."129 I would go 
further and offer that thic; Brand X issue will never be 
resolved by ·any court because the dispute ultimately 
reflects the dash between textualism and purposivism in 
statutory interpretation. Despite centuries of debate, that 
clash . nas not been resolved and likely never will be 
resolved.130 
The main support for the position that the Brand X 
ambiguity analysis irlcludes legislative history is Chevron, 
which states that step one is answered by resort to 
"traditional tools of statutory construction,"131 which for 
many judges would include legislative history. Chevron 
was written by Justice John Paul Stevens, a leading 
purposivist, but the Brand X opinion was written by 
Justice Clarence Thomas, a textualist (or even literalist). 
Justice Thomas framed the Brand X inquiry as whether 
"the prior court decision holds that its construction 
follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute,"132 a 
124E.g., Agostini v. Felton, S21 U.S. 203, '2537 (1997) (requiring 
lower cowts to adhere to the Court's directly controlling 
precedents, even those resting on rationales rejected in other 
decisions) . 
125Usually between one and four. 
126For example, the Court recently denied certiorari on the 
important issue of the amenability of tax accrual workpapers to 
the federal tax liens. United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21 (1st 
Cir. 2009) (en bane), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3320 (2010). This is a 
reminder that importance alone does not guarantee obtaining 
the Supreme Court's attention . 
1272010 WL 1838297, at *7. 
128/d. at *15. 
t2?Id. 
130For discussion of these approaches to statutory interpre-
tation, see Frank B. Cross, The Throry and Practice of Statutory 
Intei:fi'etation, chs. 2 and 3 (2009). 
1 1467 U.S. at 843. 132545 U.S. at 982 (emphasis added). 
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locution that seems to limit the inquiry to the statutory 
language133 (and perhaps statutory structure and maybe 
some canons134). 
Future Brand X decisions will sometimes be written by 
purposivist judges who will embrace legislative history, 
and sometimes by textualist judges who will eschew it. 
With each new decision, one side or the other will gain 
ascendancy, but only until the next opinion penned by a 
jurist of the contrary persuasion on statutory interpreta-
tion. Intermountain-type cases won't resolve the legisla-
tive history issue, which I don't believe will ever be 
resolved. 
The history of Chevron supports this pessimistic pre-
diction. Chevron is over 25 years old and remains unclear 
in key respects. Consider four points in this regard, 
moving from general to specific. 
First, the courts - particularly the Supreme Court -
have seriously muddied the threshold question of when 
Chevron applies. By one count, the Supreme Court has 
applied no fewer than seven distinct deference regimes in 
the years after Chevron - often without explanation of 
why one regime was used instead of another135 -
leaving lower courts with inadequate guidance,136 and 
the Supreme Court's deference jurisprudence a mess.137 
Second, when Chevron is held to provide the govern~ 
ing s tandard, there is confusion about how its steps are to 
be applied. Intermountain, using Chevron s tep orie, held 
that the statute unambiguously forecloses the regulation 
(or at least that Colony's view of tJ:t.e statute does). But it 
has long been thought that cow-ts manipulate the step 
one analysis to reach the desired results or, more gener-
ously, that step one holdings have a "length of the 
Chancellor's foot" quality.100 "The threshold determina-
tion of ambiguity remains the most troubling aspect of 
the Court's deference jurisprudence."139 
133See, e.g., AARP v. EEOC, 390 F. Supp.2d 437, 445 (E.D. Pa. 
2005) (stating that terms in Bmnd X "clarified the Chevron 
standard itself"), aff d on other gro11nds, 489 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 
2007). 
134Brand X itself referred to a substantive canon: the rule of 
leni7s. 545 U.S. at 985. 1 5William N. Eskridge and Lawrence E. Bauer, "The Con-
tinuwn of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency 
Statutory Interpretation From Chevron to Hamdan," 96 Geo. LJ. 
1083, 1098-1117 (2008). 
136See, e.g., Wilderness Society v. United States Fish & Wildlife 
Serv., 316 F.3d 913, 921 (9th Cir. 2003); Adrian Vermeule, "Mead 
in the Trenches," 71 Geo. Wasli. L. Rev. 347, 361 (2003) ("the Court 
has inadvertently sent the lower courts stumbling into a no-
man's land"). 137Eskridge and Bauer, supra note 135, at 1157; see also Lisa 
Schultz Bressman, "How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of 
Agency Action," 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1443, 1464 (2005); Jim Rossi, 
"Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within U1e 
Architecture of Chevron," 42 Wm. & Man; L. Rev. 1105, 1125 
(2001) (noting "much W'\certainty regarding how Skidmore 
should be applied to agency interpretations of law" as a result 
of ~ost-Chevron case law). · 
38See, e.g., Note, '"How Clear Is Clear' in Chevron's Step 
One?" 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1687, 1691-1692 (2005). 
139J. Lyn Entrikin Goering, "Tailoring Deference to Variety 
With a Wink and a Nod to Chevron: The. Roberts Court and the 
(Footnote continued in next column.) 
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Third, in post-Chevron cases the Supreme Court has 
been inconsistent on what the role of the "traditional 
tools of statutory construction" is in the step one analysis. , . ~· 
In some cases, it has applied at least some of these tools 
at step one, 140 w hile in other cases, it has not done so even 
though presented w ith the opportunity.141 
Fourth, if traditional tools should be applied, there is ~ 
little consistency as to w hat those tools are. This may 
result from the difficulties of coalition building,142 slop-
piness, or results orientation.143 Whatever the cause, the i 
inconsistency is unlikely to be resolved anytime soon.t44 J 
The interpretative tool stressed by the Intermountain 1· 
majority is legislative history. Supreme Court cases sup-
port at least three inconsistent positions on legislative l 
history: (1) the history is to be considered at step onel4S; ~ 
(2) it is not to be considered at s tep.one146; and (3) it is to I 
be considered at step one but only if the statutory text is 
ambiguous.147 As the Halpern/Holmes concurrence 
shows,148 lower court decisions also are split.149 
The post-Chevron case law is a mess, largely because of 
the Su p reme Court's own vacillation and divisions on the 
case's purport. The passage of time has confused the 
situation more, with some declaring Chevron dead15-0 and 
Amorphous Doctrine of Judicial Review of Agency Interpreta-
tions of Law," 36 J. Legis. 18, 89 (2010). 
140£.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 583 (2000). 141E.g., Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1172 (2009) (Stevens, 
J., conclll'ring in part and dissenting in part); Auer v. Robbins, 519 
U.S. 452, 462-463 (1997). A .. 
142See Frank H. Easterbrook, "Ways of Criticizing the Court," ~ 
95 Harv. L. Rev. 802, 815-817 (1982). 
143See Goering, supra note 139, at 90. ("More often than not, 
a shifting majority of the Roberts Court appears to cherry-pick 
among [traditional tools of statutory construction] to reach its 
desired result.") 
1
""The issue has been part of the universe of Chevron 
discussion for many years. See, e.g., Mark Seidenield, "A Syn-
copated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in 
Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes," 73 Tex. L. Rev. 
83, 85 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, "Law and Administration After 
Chevron," 90 Co/um. L. Rev. 2071, 2105-2119 (1990). 
145E.g., FDA v. Brawn & Williamson Tobacco Co., 529 U.S. 120, 
133, 137 (2000). 
146E.g., Nat'/ R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Bostim & Me. Corp., 503 
U.S. 407, 417 (1992); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 293 
n.4 (1988). 
.
147E.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. DOE, 550 U.S. 81, 89 
(2007); HUD v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 132-133 (2002). 
148See 2010 WL 1838297, at 14-15 (providing a circuit-by-
circuit breakdown of cases on the issue). 
149Compare Succar v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 8, 31 (1st Cir. 2005) (use 
of legislative history "is permissible and may even be required 
at stage one of Chevron") with United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 
292 (3d Cir. 2008) (agreeing with the government's argument 
that "legislative history should not be considered at 01evro11 
step one"), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 937 (2009); see also Melina Forte, 
Case Comment, "May Legislative H.istory Be Considered at 
Chevron Step One? The Third Circuit Dances the Chevron Two-
Ste~ in United States v. Geiser," 54 Vill. L. Rev. 727 (2009). 
50 Ann Graham, "Searching for Chevron in Muddy Watters: 
The Roberts Court and Judicial Review of Agency Regulations," 1£1 
60 Admin. L. Rev. 229, 239 (2008). ("Classical Chevron analysis is '1 
dead.") Graham does not mourn that perceived demise because 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
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others urging that it be relegated to the doctrinal dust-
bin.151 I expect no better of Brand X, at least regarding this 
issue. Against this larger context, future Intermountain-
type cases - no matter the holdings - are unlikely to 
have lasting effect. 
! 1i- ' 
V. Roads Not Traveled 
-·· ,' ... "·~ · -
... J:'here may be ways to attack the regulations beyond 
fuo~e developed in the Intermountain opinions. Some 
pos~ibilities are explored below. I am not endorsing these 
~{gu.ments, instead offering them to provoke discussion 
and thought.152 
1 ; i'he arguments proceed from a common foundation. 
S.1,ibseguent cases have shown that Chevron does not 
provide . the analytical framework for all cases in which 
agency rules are challenged. Instead, Chevron will apply 
only if both of two conditions are present: (1) Congress 
has delegated (either expressly or implicitly) rulemaking 
authority to the agency, and (2) the agency issued the 
challenged position in the exercise of that authority.153 
One's initial reaction might be similar to that of the IRS, 
which I paraphrase here: "Of course the conditions are 
satisfied here. In section 7805(a), Congre~s delegated to 
'Jreasury general rulemaking authority as to the entire 
~ode, and Treasury stated that the 2009 regulations were 
. iSsued pursuant to section 7805(a)."154 That initial reac-
·' . tion may ultimately be correct, but I want to explore it a 
bit 'more deeply before accepting it. 
""'. 'It is probably pointless to' dispute the second condi-
tion, . but there may be grounds on which to question 
}Yl,l~ther Congress delegated to lreasury the power to 
. ma~e .a !111e extending the six-year limitations period to 
taXdeficiencies attributable to overstated basis. Below we 
. ,,;-/. t~W4i~~r three perspectives: (1) the significance for del-··.;.:~;:\:'..,.} ~g1alion purposes of lreasury's failure to use the notice-
·.,.:JLsJ : · ~~:c<>,mme~t process for the. temporary r7~lations, . (2) 
·' / ···' • · ~~~er section 7805(a) constitutes an explicit ~elegation 
he sees Supreme Court deference jurisprudence as "a confus-
. !vmuddle of decisions which turn on internecine disputes, 
Ji'Ckfilling from the desired result, and flavor-of-the-week ana-
lyticalmodelsJ' Id. at 262. See also Note, "Justifying the Chevron 
:Poctrine: Insights From the Rule of Lenity," 123 Harv. L. Rev. 
Z043;. 2043 (2010). ("Where Chevron deference was once the 
b~fkR,:ound presumption, it is becoming the exception.") 
,~1 :E.g., William R. Andersen, "Against Chevron: A Modest 
roposal," 56 Admin. L. Rev. 957, 964-969 (2004); Jack M. 
B.~erman; "End the Failed Chevrvn Experiment Now: How 
f:/Jevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled," 
42.:Conn. L. Rev. 779, 783 (2010). ("Currently, the application of 
th.e Chevron doctrine is highly unpredictable, and the decision 
·t5elf.is.cited for opposing propositions.") 
·~~In this, I proceed in the same spirit as a. prominent 
-· rican theologian, who described one of his books as "an 
ei:npt at a partial exploration. Its significance, if any, lies in the 
brc'es it draws into the questioning." Ewert H. Cousins, 
· t .. oj.t/ie 21st Century (1998). 
.. E.g., United States v: Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 237 (2001). In 
·. evron literature, this dimension is sometimes called Chev-
ep l .S. because it fits between step one and step two. See 
· g, supra note 139, at 44 and n.232. 
54See IRS brief, supra note 1, at 24. 
":NOTES, August 23, 2010 
COMMENTARY I SPECIAL REPORT 
in this case, and (3) whether Congress implicitly del-
egated the power by leaving a gap in sections 6229 and 
6501 for Treasury to fill. 
A. Failure to Use Notice-and-Comment 
. The Supreme Court justices have been split between 
those who want to implement Chevron using bright lines 
and those who prefer facts-and-circumstances ap-
proaches.155 So far, the latter group has prevailed, adding 
to the Chevron muddle. 
One particularly strong indicator of Chevron's appli-
cability is that the agency's position went through the 
notice-and-comment process. In Mead, the Court said that 
the requisite delegation "may be shown in a variety of 
ways, as by an agency's power to engage in adjudication 
or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by sorrie other 
indication of a comparable congressional intent."156 Some 
nuance is needed to connect this statement to the two 
p redicates for Chevron's applicability. If Congress re-
quired an agency to make a particular rule through the 
notice-and-comment process that would bear on the first 
predicate: that Congress delegated the particular power 
to the agency. That the agency chose to go ·through that 
process would bear on the second predicate: 'that the 
agency was acting in the exercise of that delegated 
power.157 
Although the Mead statement suggests that notice-
and-comment is one of several indicators of Chevron's 
applicability,158 it is a particularly important one. Its 
absence does not by itself render Chevron inapposite, but 
it does create a hill fo climb. As one commentator noted: 
By the end of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist's 
last term, the court had settled into a relatively 
predictable dichotomy. The Court generally applied 
Chevron deference if a rule had been adopted in 
notice-and-comment proceedings, and otherwise 
defaulted to [less deferential] analysis of various 
persuasive factors to determine whether a less 
formal agency interpretation warranted defer-
ence.1s9 
155This is well illustrated by the exchange between Justice 
Breyer's concurrence and Justice Scalia's dissent in Brand X. 
Compare 545 U.S. at 1003-1005 (Breyer, J.) with id. at 1014-1016 
(Scalia, J.). 156533 U.S. at 227. 
157Cf. Long Island Care at Home, 551 U.S. at 173 (applying the 
Chevron standard and emphasizing that the agency interpreta-
tion had been the product of notice-and-conunent even though 
use of that process is not required for merely interpretive rules). 1ssro reinforce the point, Justice Breyer maintains that "the 
existence of a formal rulemaking proceeding is neither a, neces-
sary nor a sufficient condition for according Chevron defer-
ence . . . . It is not a necessary condition because an agency might 
arrive at an authoritative interpretation of a congressional 
enactment in other ways." Brand X, supra, 545 U.S. at 1004 
(Breyer, J., concurring). In context, Justice Breyer appears to be 
referring to notice-and-comment rulemaking although that is 
usually described as informal, not formal, rulemaking. See, e.g., 
Alfred C. Aman Jr., Administrative Law and Process sec. 4.02 (2d 
ed. 2006). 
159Goering, supra note 139, at 20; see also id. at 47. 
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Thus, Treasury's decision to skip notice-and-comment 
undercuts the argument for delegation in this case. This 
perspective is not dispositive, but does create the need -
if the regulations are to be sustained - to identify "some 
other indication of.a comparable congressional intent" to 
delegate to Treasury the power to create this binding rule. 
Whatever the merits of this perspective, it is easy to 
understand why the Intermountain majority did not ad-
vance such an argument. Because the temporary regula-
tions were simultaneously published in proposed 
form,160 regulations objection would disappear once the 
notice-and-comment process is complete. It would not 
accomplish the majority's apparent goal of invalidating 
the regulations for all cases, whether litigated yet or not. 
B. Explicit Delegation 
The explicit delegation portion of the argument in-
volves analysis that I will develop more fully in a future 
article. In brief, I believe that, to date, our dichotomiza-
tion of tax regulations has been misdirected. As discussed 
in Section III.A.2, tax practitioners are accustomed to 
classifying regulations as either specific authority or 
general authority. I think we should drop these labels. It 
would be more helpful to refer to the precise statutory 
language by which Congress delegated power to write 
particular regulations. If one were to do that, it could be 
argued that the language of section 7805(a) is insufficient 
to delegate to Treasury power to write the new regula-
tions. These propositions are explored below. 
1. Inadequacy of the traditional distinction. Numerous 
cases distinguish between specific authmity and general 
authority regulations, and recite the boilerplate proposi-
tion that the former are entitled to greater deference than 
the latter.161 This distinction is of dubious value and 
should be eliminated for three reasons. 
First, the traditional distinction is deceptive. P62 and 
others163 doubt that reality matches the rhetoric. If a court 
dislikes a regulation, it probably will find a way to 
invalidate it even if it is specific authority in nature.164 If 
a court likes a regulation, it probably will find a way to 
uphold it even if it is general authority in nature.165 I 
16
°Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 74 Fed. Reg. 49,354 (Sept. 
28, 2009). 161E.g., United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24-25 
(1982); Helvering v. R.J. Retjnolds Co., 306 U.S. 110, 114 (1939). 162Steve R. Johnson, "Swallows as It Might Have Been: 
Req:&ations Revising Case Law," supra note 4. 63E.g., Boris I. Bittker, Martin J. McMahon Jr., and Lawrence 
A. Zelenak, Federal Income Taxation of Individuals, 46-5 (3d ed. 
2002); Asimow, supra note 89, at 357; Mitchell Rogovin and 
Donald L. Korb, "The Four R's Revisited: Regulations, Rulings, 
Reliance and Retroactivity in the 21st Century: A View From 
Within," Taxes, Aug. 2009, p. 21, at 22. 164Specific authority regulations sometimes have been invali-
dated by the courts. E.g., Rite Aide Corp. v. United States, 255 F.3d 
1357 (Fed. Cir. 2001), superseded in part by American Jobs 
Creation Act of 2004, P.L. 108-357, section 844, 118 Stat. 1418, 
1600; Phillips Petroleum v. Commissioner, 70 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 
1995) (unpublished opinion); Estate of Bullard v. Commissioner, 87 
T.C. 261 (1986). 165
"Even if we regard the challenged regulation as interpre-
tive because it was promulgated under.section 7805(a)'s general 
(Footnote continued in next column.) 
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cannot recall a case in which the court said in essence 
"We're invalidating this general authority regulation, bu~ 
we would have upheld it had it been specific authority in 
nature." If there are such cases, they are rare. 
Second, the traditional distinction is unnecessary. In 
part, courts are motivated to intone the traditional dis-
tinction out of respect for Congress. Section 7805(a) 
covers the entire code, and yet Congress has written more 
than a thousand specific authority provisions.166 There 
must be some reason why Congress writes specific 
authority provisions. If section 7805(a) effects complete 
delegation, aren't the numerous specific authority provi-
sions mere surplusage?167 According specific authority 
regulations nominally higher dignity than general au-
thority regulations avoids the surplusage problem and 
any implied derogation of the work of Congress. 
But we need not create a legal fiction to avoid such 
lese-majeste. One reason, described below, is that specific 
authority provisions usually are worded differently than 
section 7805(a). There is no surplusage when sections do 
different things or convey different commands.16s 
There is another reason the legal fiction is unnecessary. 
Surplusage appears problematic when one assumes that 
Congress, through its legislation, is speaking only to the 
courts as the statutes' interpreters. But this one-
dimensional model is flawed. A legislature speaks not 
just to the courts but also to several different "interpre-
tive cornmunities."169 
. One such community is the agency charged with 
administering the statute in question: Indeed, agencies 
typically interpret statutes earlier and more often than 
courts do,170 a fact that abates surplusage concerns. A 
specific authority provision - even if worded identically 
to section 7805(a) - can be understood as Congress 
instructing Treasury, not the courts, that Congress is 
rulemaking grant ... we must still treat the regulation with 
deference." Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437, 447 (2003); 
see also Nathe/ v. Commissioner, No. 09-1955, 2010 WL 2183960, at 
*5 (2d Cir. June 2, 2009), Doc 2010-12160, 2010 TNT 106-12; 
McNamee v. Department of the Treasunj, 488 F.3d 100, 106 (2d Cir. 
2007), Doc 2010-12575, 2010 TNT 101-13. In fact, the great 
majority of challenges to general authority tax regulations fail. 166See Coverdale, supra note 12, at 52. 167 As examples of the judicial reluctance to find surplusage 
in legislative enactments, see Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 
U.S. 51, 63 (2003); Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 
U.S. 104, 112 (1991). 168E.g., Connecticut Nat'! Bank v. Gennain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 
(1992). 16 See, e.g., William S. Blatt, "Interpretive Communities: The 
Missing Element in Statutory Interpretation," 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
629, 641-649 (2001). 170Substantial literature now exists as to statutory interpre-
tation by agencies. E.g., Jerry Mashaw, "Norms, Practices, and 
the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry Into Agency 
Statutory Interpretation," 57 Admin. L. Rev. 501 (2005); Nathaniel 
L. Nathanson, "Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation 
of Statutes," 3 Vand. L. Rev. 470 (1950). 
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particularly interested in action on this front, or to 
reassure Treasury that there's political support for attend-
ing to this matter. m 
Third, and most important, the traditional distinction 
deflects the attention of the courts from the precise 
language of the statute containing the specific authoriza-
tion. The traditional distinction lumps specific authority 
statutes into one category regardless of the fact that such 
statutes often word their delegations differently. Con-
gress would be better honored by giving effect to, rather 
than largely disregarding, textual differences. 
2. Textually nuanced interpretation. Section 7805(a) con-
fers on T~~asury general autliority to "prescribe all need-
~ rules and regulations for the enforcement of" the 
code. Many specific authority provisions use identical or 
similar language. 
But many other specific authority provisions use dif-
ferent language from section 7805(a). For example: 
· • Treasury "is authorized to prescribe such regula-
tions as may be nec~ssary or appropriate to deter-
mine whether an interest in a corporation is to be 
· treated ... as stock or indebtedness."172 
,. : • Trea~ury /1 shall prescribe such regulations as may be 
necessary or appropriate to prevent the avoidance of 
subsection (a).'1173 
• Treasury "may by regulations exempt" designated 
types of organizations from the general rules . of 
"this section."174 
• Treasury "may issue regulations or othei; guidance 
providing for adjustmen t of the [rule generally 
prescribed by the section) on the basis of geographic 
differences in housing costs."175 
·'. • Treasury "may by regulations provide that other 
restrictions (in addition to those identified in the 
.,,,-;__ . statute] . shall be disregarded in determining the 
value of" transferred property.116 
• Treasury "shall prescribe rules which reaJ.locate 
items of income, deduction, credit, exclusion, or 
other allowance to the extent necessary to prevent 
the avoidance of tax imposed by reason of this 
paragraph. [Treasury] may prescribe rules which 
exclude from the tax imposed by subsection (a) 
171Neither of these messages, however, need translate into 
greater judicial deference for specific authority regulations. Both 
just encourage Treasury to act. They do not guarantee that 
Congress or the courts will endorse the substantive content of 
~hatever regs are ultimately promulgated. 
· • 
172Section 385(a); see also section 469(1) (Treasury "shall 
prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate 
to carry out provisions of this section, inclucling regulations" to 
carry out five enumerated functions); section 585(b)(3) (Treasury 
~'shall define the term loan and prescribe such regulations as 
may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this section"); 
, section 777, section 1202(k), and section 1446(f). 
173Section 504(b ). 
174Section 508(c)(2). 
' 
175Section 9ll(c)(2)(B). 176Section 2704(b )( 4). 
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amounts attributable to mileage awards which are 
used other than for transportation of persons by 
air."177 
• "Nothing in the regulations prescribed for purposes 
of chapter 24 (relating to income tax withholding) 
which provides an exclusion from 'wages' as used in 
such chapter shall be construed to require a similar 
exclusion from 'wages' in the regulations prescribed 
for purposes of this chapter" relating to employ-
ment taxes.178 
• Treasury "shall prescribe such regulations as [it] 
may deem necessary in order that the tax liability of 
any affiliated group of corporations making a con-
solidated return and of each corporation in the 
group ... may be returned, determined, computed, 
assessed, collected, and adjusted, in such manner as 
clearly to reflect the income-tax liability and the 
various factors necessary for the determination of 
such liability, and in order to prevent avoidance of 
such liability. In carrying out the preceding sen-
tence, [Treasury] may prescribe rules that are differ-
ent from the provisions of chapter 1 that would 
apply if such corporations filed separate returns."179 
Hundreds of other examples could be added, but 
those given above reveal several patterns: (1) some 
delegations allow Treasury to write rules of an interstitial 
or implemental nature to carry out the section or its 
purposes, broadly defined; (2) other delegations are more 
restrictive, limiting the scope of the delegated power to 
particular objects; (3) other delegations allow Treasury to 
define key statutory terms not defined by the statute 
itself; (4) others allow Treasury to suspend or alter results 
commanded by the statute; and (5) some provisions 
direct Treasury to act, some permit Treasury to act, and 
some prohibit Treasury from acting. 
Some of these variations are the result of deliberate 
choices and careful drafting, and courts should respect 
such legislative decisions.1so In some instances, the lan-
guage employed may have been the product of less care, 
but I believe that the statutory language should usually 
(perhaps always) be respected even in such situations. 
Courts frequently contrast language at issue with other 
statutory language that more clearly expresses the out-
come urged by a party. They do so to maintain that 
"Congress knows how to say" something when it wishes 
to convey that meaning.181 This approach sometimes 
ascribes deliberation to accidents of drafting. Though it is 
sometimes a fiction, it is a useful fiction. A similar spirit 
177Section 4261(e)(3)(C). 178Section 312l(a) (flush language). 179Section 1502. 18011rn our constitutional system, it is widely assumed that 
.. . federal judges must act as Congress's faithful agents" in 
interpreting statutes. John F. Manning, /1 Absurdity Doctrine," 
116 Harv. L. Rev. 2387, 2393-2394 (2003); see also Cass R. Sunstein, 
"Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State," 103 Harv. L. Rev. 
405, 415 (1989). 181E.g., Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 476 (2003); 
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 
176-177 (1994). 
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should apply to interpretation of varying statutes del-
egating tax rulemaking power to the Treasury. 
This approach respects Congress and the separation of 
powers principle. As has been observed in another con-
text, "If Congress enacted into law something different 
from what it intended, then it should amend the statute 
to conform to its intent. It is beyond our province to 
rescue Congress from its drafting errors .... This allows 
both of our branches to adhere to our respected, and 
respective constitutional roles."1s2 Few, if any, principles 
of statutory interpretation are absolute, of course, and the 
courts have "corrected" apparent drafting errors under 
the absurdity, scrivener's error, and other doctrines.183 
However, no less staunch a purposivist than Justice 
Steve~s has observed that adherence to text is particu-
larly rmportant in areas involving "technical and com-
plex laws,"184 a characterization that fits our tax statutes. 
. The traditional dichotomy proceeds categorically, pay-
mg more heed to the specific authority versus general 
authority categorization than to textual divergences 
among dilferent specific authority delegations. This ap-
proach should be replaced with greater attention to 
statutory language. 
3. Application to the 'overstated basis' regulations. Did 
Congress explicitly, th.rbugh section 7805(a), delegate to 
Treasury the power to extend the six-year limitations 
period to basi~ overstatements?t85 One could argue that 
the ariswer is no. That section authorizes regulations for 
the enforcement of the code. Arguably that contemplates 
enforcement of code sections within the ambits already 
set by Congress, not enlargement of those ambits. If 
future decisions follow this reasoning, Chevron is not 
triggered in Intermountain-type cases by an explicit del-
egation. 
182l.ilmie v. United Stales Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 542 (2004) 
(Kennedy, J., writing for a unanimous Court); see also Gorospe v. 
Commissioner, 451 F.3d 966, 969-970 (9th Cir. 2006). 
183See, e.g., William N. Eskridge Jr., Philip P. Frickey, and 
Elizabeth Garrett, Legislation and Stat11ton; Interpretation 267-271 
(2d ed. 2006); Steve R Johnson, "The 'Absurd Results' Doctrine 
in State and Local Tax Cases," State Tax Notes, Oct. 19, 2009, p. 
195, Doc 2009-21703, or 2009 SIT 199-4. 
184St. Mnrlin Evarigelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 
U.S. 772, 791 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
1851ne IRS, of course, Utinks that there is no extension, that 
th~ resu.lt is consistent with the statutes as they stand. See IRS 
brief, supra note l, at 10. The reason the new regulations were 
ne.eded, however, is that most courts disagree with the IRS on 
this point. 
852 
C. Implicit Delegation 
If an explicit delegation does not support the section 
6501/6229 regulations, an implicit delegation probably {; 
doesn't either. An implicit delegation may existl& when a \ 
gap in a statute reasonably implies that Congress in-
tended the agency to fill the gap.1B7 H owever, courts are 
reluctant to find gaps in, or to allow supplementation or 
modification of, statutes that are long, detailed, or intri-
cate.188 Supposed implicit Chevron delegations have.been 
rejected on this basis.189 Section 6501(e) is a detailed and 
carefully articulated provision. 
VI. Conclusion 
The Tax Court's Intermountain decision surely is not 
the last shot that will be fired in the overstated basis 
statute of limitations battle. The government has ap-
pealed Intermountain, and the validity and applicability 
of the new regulations will surely be tested in future 
cases. 
Based on the above analysis, the temporary regula-
tions should continue to be invalidated. Leaving aside 
the conside.rations in Section V, however, once the regu-
lations have been finalized following completion of 
notice-and-comment, they should be upheld, particularly 
if applied only prospectively. Taxpayers who already 
have won their cases should be safe, but taxpayers whose 
cases have not yet been decided will be in jeopardy. 
As important as the particular issue is to tax admin-
istration, the wider dimensions of Intermountain and 
related future cases may ultimately be of greater import. 
The aspects elaborated above are only some of the 
interesting matters raised by lntermountain. The case is a I{ 
treasure trove
1 
for those interested in tax procedure, and 'I,_ 
we can eager y anticipate future decisions on the validity 
of the basis overstatement statute of limitations regula-
tions. Perhaps abo.ve all, Intermountain and related future 
decisions may help shake us out of our professional 
insularity and convince us that tax practitioners and 
scholars discount general administrative law only at peril 
to their professional competence. 
186The precise role of implicit delegations in the · Clievro11 
scheme has been debated for years. See, e.g., Goering, supra note 
139, at 45; Kristin E. Hick.man, "The Need for Mead: Rejecting 
Tax Exceptionalism in J udida.l Deference," 90 Min11. L. Rev. 1537, 
1549-1550 (2006). 
187E.g., Mor/011 v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974), quoted by 
Chevron, s11pra, 467 U.S. at 843-844. 
188E.g., United States v. Brocknmp, 519 U.S. 347, 350-352 (1997); 
Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 579 {1965). 
189E.g., ABA v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 469 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
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